“I Pine for True Closeness”: Muḥammad Iqbāl’s Uneasy Relationship with Christianity, and the Islamic Social Ideal by Corbman, Marjorie L. & Hartung, Jan-Peter
 South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic
Journal 
Free-Standing Articles | 2017
“I Pine for True Closeness”: Muḥammad Iqbāl’s
Uneasy Relationship with Christianity, and the
Islamic Social Ideal
Marjorie L. Corbman and Jan-Peter Hartung
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/4363
DOI: 10.4000/samaj.4363
ISSN: 1960-6060
Publisher
Association pour la recherche sur l'Asie du Sud (ARAS)
 
Electronic reference
Marjorie L. Corbman and Jan-Peter Hartung, « “I Pine for True Closeness”: Muḥammad Iqbāl’s Uneasy
Relationship with Christianity, and the Islamic Social Ideal », South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic
Journal [Online], Free-Standing Articles, Online since 31 July 2017, connection on 19 April 2019. URL :
http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/4363  ; DOI : 10.4000/samaj.4363 
This text was automatically generated on 19 April 2019.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International License.
“I Pine for True Closeness”:
Muḥammad Iqbāl’s Uneasy
Relationship with Christianity, and
the Islamic Social Ideal
Marjorie L. Corbman and Jan-Peter Hartung
1 “My life has been spent mostly in the study of Western philosophy,”1 wrote Muḥammad
Iqbāl, the revered Muslim poet-cum-philosophical thinker of British India, some thirteen
years before his death in April 1938, “and this point of thought has become nearly a
second nature to me. I cannot express well in Urdu what is in my heart” (Iqbal 1951:I/47,
quoted in Schimmel [1963:316]).2
2 One may read this as a massive understatement, given that Iqbāl attained most of his
fame for  his  more  often than not  philosophically  charged Persian  and Urdu poetry.
However, there might nonetheless be a feasible explanation for the appropriateness of
Iqbāl’s remark: after all, his writings, whether in prose or poetry, as well as his speeches,
often show a struggle to transcend the Western contexts in which Iqbāl first discovered
many of the ideas that formed the backbone of his own philosophical and socio-religious
thought.  Such a  conceivable  over-reliance of  an “Oriental”  author  on “non-Oriental”
ideas might well be explicable in the light of the insights provided by Postcolonial and
Subaltern Studies: having been fully embedded in the colonial setup, Iqbāl, same as any
other colonial subject, was consequently denied discursive powers, or, in other words, the
“permission to speak” in self-representation (prominently,  see Said [1978:109–10] and
Spivak [1988:284–5]). Moreover, as a colonial subject educated in the heart of the Empire
and in “non-oriental” knowledge, he must, by definition, always be a “passive reactor”
(Said  1978:109);  such reaction includes  prominently  a  defensive  attitude  born out  of
resentment against the imposition of an alien set of norms and “truths” as valid. Thus, it
is understandable that, instead of directing his religious polemic against the religious
traditions of the Hindus, the religion of the majority of his fellow countrymen, Iqbāl’s
conception of “Islam” is often specifically drawn in contrast to Christianity, “Islam” being
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defined as exactly what “Christianity” is not. This criticism of Christianity, however, was
formulated not only as a larger religious argument but to quite an extent as a social
comparison, in which he argued for an egalitarian Muslim commonwealth in contrast to
what he perceived as the inequities of “Christian culture.”
3 Given the important role that Christian missionary work played for the justification and
sustaining of the colonial  project (see,  for example,  Corbman [2012]),  Iqbāl’s  at times
polemical  criticism  of  Christianity  was  clearly  rooted  in  anti-imperialist  sentiments;
therefore  it  could  well function  as  anti-imperialist  rhetoric.  His  relationship  with
Christianity,  however,  was never an unequivocal  one.  After all,  self-empowerment by
actively  appropriating  the  stock  of  knowledge  of  both  sides,  however,  a  fact  that
prompted  such  notions  as  “hybridity”  (Bhabha  1994:112–5)  and  “agents  of  change”
(Reetz 1997:9–11), put colonial subjects such as Iqbāl in the position to weighting up the
respective arguments before embarking on a possible refutation of one of the two sides. It
is perhaps a signifier of his hybridity that Iqbāl’s take on Christianity remained somewhat
ambivalent throughout the various phases of his life, a fact that can well explain away the
possible impression of  anachronisms in the following exposition of  his views.  On the
other hand, however, it seems safe to assume that his thinking on this matter took a
decisive turn when it became increasingly dominated by the contingencies of an actual
political  and social  reality—especially  as  the  question of  Muslim separatism from an
envisioned democratic  and secular  postcolonial  Indian  polity  became more  urgent—,
perhaps at the expense of philosophical consistency.
4 One may  ask,  however,  why,  compared  to  indigenous  Indian  religious  traditions,
Christianity was granted a comparatively prominent place in Iqbāl’s writings. After all,
from the spiritus rector of the “Two-Nation Theory” (Iqbal 1945:3–39, esp. 12 [Presidential
Address delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad on the 29th
December, 1930]) one could easily assume that the dominant counterpart at which Iqbāl
would chafe  him was  rather  the  increasingly  standardized and politicized Hinduism.
While  the  latter  was  predominantly  shaped  by  acculturative  socio-religious  (for  this
heuristic concept, see Jones [1994:1–4]) organizations like the Ārya Samāj, established in
1875, and various politically activist Hindu associations that would soon find an umbrella
in  the  Hindū  Mahāsabhā,  formed  in  1915,  even  personalities  like  Gāṅdħī  (1869–1948)
appeared  at  times  surprisingly  close  to  their  religiously  charged  rhetoric,3 which
correspondingly at times filled even close Muslim associates of his, like Abū’l‑Kalām Āzād
(1888–1958), with some consternation (see, for example, Azad [1988:76–8, 89, 96–9]). In
fact,  this increased polarization between what in the nineteenth century had become
Hinduism,  and  Islam  is  the  very  backdrop  against  which  Iqbāl’s  rather  theological
engagement with Christianity—as epitome of the Other that is yet somehow related to the
Self—may best be viewed. Thus, Iqbāl’s engagement with Christianity can be seen to shift,
generally speaking,  over time:  from his  early scholarly engagement with Christianity
during what we wish to regard as formative period during which he acquired most of his
education (ca. 1898–1908), via a middle period during which he taught at his alma mater,
the Government College of Lahore, as well as practicing as a lawyer (ca. 1909–1926), to his
politically  most  active  third  period  between  his  election  to  the  Punjab  Legislative
Assembly in January 1927 and his death in April 1938.
5 In this article we aim to demonstrate the crucial role Iqbāl’s polemic engagement with
Christianity  had  for  the  development  of  his  socio-political  beliefs,  particularly  his
advocacy for the creation of a separate, independent Muslim state in northwest India. In
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doing so, we will build upon other scholarly investigations of Iqbāl’s engagement with
European ideas and concepts (such as, most notably, Annemarie Schimmel’s grounding of
Iqbāl’s religious philosophy in mystical and philosophical traditions of both the “West”
and the “East”) through attention to the ways in which Iqbāl creatively re-appropriated
his Christian sources (1) to form a sweeping critique of Christianity and its historical
expression in socio-political inequality, and, (2) correspondingly, to describe an idealized
vision of an egalitarian, separate Muslim society.
 
Appraisal
6 Surprisingly, while Iqbāl’s literary œuvre leaves little doubt that he perceived Christianity
—and, by implication, Hinduism—as clearly inferior to Islam, especially his early writings
reveal  nonetheless  quite  an attraction or  fascination with the aesthetics  of  his  main
religious opponent. In particular, drawing upon the New Testament and other Christian
sources as well  as the rich tradition of  Muslim portrayals of  Jesus (see,  for example,
Khalidi [2001]), he saw in the central figure of the Christian faith an imaginative spirit
expressed through his parables, arguably a match for the likes of Rūmī and Shakespeare
(Schimmel 1963:265), and often used the “cross” as a prototypical image of suffering, for
instance in the Jāvīdnāmah from the middle period of his literary work:
Shortsighted men have stirred up commotions
and hung [God’s] true servant upon a cross.
kam nigāhān-i fitnah’hā angīkhtand
bandah-yi ḥaqq rā ba‑dār āvīkhtand
(Jāvīdnāmah in Iqbāl [1342sh] 1370sh:273–387, here 338, line 20)4
The influence of Christian language, as well, permeates his prose, often using phrases
from Christian Scriptures: “like pearls do we live and move and have our being in the
perpetual flow of Divine life,” he wrote, using a language that clearly resembles that of
Acts 17:28 (Iqbal 1930:99–100).5 In one of his Stray Thoughts, dating from as early as 1917,
he appears to re‑appropriate creatively the phrasing of Matthew 5:48 and, more broadly
speaking,  the  poetic  language  of  the  New Testament  to  argue  for  his  conception  of
self‑actualization: “God is power. Be ye, then, like your Father Who is in heaven” (Iqbal
1964:49).6
7 Iqbāl’s attraction to a Christian aesthetic at this early stage, but also the nucleus of his
later challenging of Christian theological premises, can already be seen in his engagement
in his  early writings with the thought of  the late medieval  Sufi  ʿAbd al‑Karīm al-Jīlī
(d. 826/1424) of Baghdad, an important figure for the popularization of the thought of Ibn
ʿArabī  (d. 638/1240)  (see Ritter [1960]).  In his  doctoral  dissertation,  published in 1908
under the title The Development of Metaphysics in Persia at a time when Iqbāl’s attitude to
Christianity was more appreciative, he described at length what he calls al‑Jīlī’s “Doctrine
of the Trinity” (Iqbal 1908:170), in which “Oneness,” “He-ness,” and “I‑ness” form the
three movements of “Pure Being” (Iqbal 1908:153), the third movement being expressed
in an “external manifestation, which is the self-diremption of the Essence of God and
man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect man” (Iqbal 1908:171).7
Iqbāl pointed that that al‑Jīlī himself did not recognize Christianity as a source for his
theories, but he himself acknowledged that “[al-Jīlī] reproduces the Christian doctrine of
the Trinity, except that his god-man is Muḥammad instead of Christ” (Iqbal 1964:24).
More surprisingly, given Iqbāl’s later emphasis on the indivisibility of God, he asserts that
“no Islamic thinker will object to the deep meaning of the Trinity as explained by this
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author” (Iqbal 1964:25). This restatement of the doctrine of the Trinity is most certainly a
critique of the Christian theological position, but it shows from early on a preoccupation
with restructuring Christian religious doctrine in an Islamic framework.
8 Iqbāl’s  rather  positive  attitude  towards  Christianity  in  the  formative  period  of  his
intellectual life, that is the years between 1898 and 1908, begs of course some explanation,
especially given his later increasingly critical stance. A possible explanation may be his
close acquaintance with Thomas Walker Arnold (1864–1930), during the years 1898 and
1904 Professor of Philosophy at the Government College Lahore.8 In this capacity, Arnold
acted also as an interlocutor for both the British colonial administration and especially
the Muslim communities in Northern India;9 his various preserved lecture notes indicate
that “philosophy” was understood rather broadly, and would nowadays rather feature in
the field of the Study of Religion (TWA Papers IV/16 and 17). A close associate of the aged
Sir  Sayyid  Aḥmad  Khān  (1817–1898),  Arnold  appears  to  have  shared  this  Muslim
educationist’s desire for an increasingly egalitarian cultural translations of an “Islamic”
and a “Christian civilization,” as indicated by Sir Sayyid’s commentary of the Bible as
much as by numerous of Arnold’s writings ([Khān] 1278–85/1862–8:I).10 The latter’s strong
interest in Muslim philosophy and mysticism was rooted in his conviction that these two
fields  of  enquiry  provided the  best  possible  basis  of  an  approximation of  Islam and
Christianity. Especially in his unpublished articles “The Influence of Islam on European
Thought” and “The Culture of Christendom and Islam,” Arnold stressed the need for
cross-cultural translation of what he, in line with the zeitgeist, perceived as “civilizations,”
11 in order to appreciate those commonalities, rather than stress the strong dogmatic and
cultural differences. Despite lacking proper textual evidence, among others from Iqbāl’s
dedication of the Bazm-i Iqbāl edition of his doctoral dissertation to Arnold (1954; Iqbal
1954:v), we may infer that the egalitarian view of Christianity and Islam held by the latter
has been of consequence to the young Iqbāl and could well have triggered his interest in
Christian thought in the widest possible sense.
Theological Critique
9 Given  the  Christian  background  of  many  of  his  influences,  Iqbāl’s  engagement  with
Christian theological concepts was perhaps even more inevitable. Over time, however, he
would begin to increasingly challenge several of Christianity’s constituents in response to
the socio-political developments in colonial India, in which he developed his own views.
As  a  result  of  the  former,  he  appeared  to  gravitate  to  critics  of  a  monolithically
envisioned “Christian culture” from within Christendom, such as Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910),
who,  in  his  “ethical  monotheism,”  represented  for  him  Christian  religiosity  free  of
unacceptable  innovations  (bidʿāt)  (Iqbāl  [1342sh]  1370sh:188–272,  here  261f,  Ṫālsṫāʾe  [
Payām-i Mashriq]; Schimmel 1963:267). In his Jāvīdnāmah, Iqbāl depicted a dream of Tolstoy
in which Christian culture is accused of
[making] the body the spirit’s tomb.
What we have done unto His [i.e. Jesus’] humanity
His community has done unto His divinity.
az tū jān rā dakhmah mīgirdad badan
ānchih mā kardīm bā nā sūt-i ū
millat-i ū kard bā lāhūt-i ū.
(Iqbāl [1342sh] 1370sh:300, lines 8–9 [Jāvīdnāmah])
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In this regard, Iqbāl also showed a close affinity with John Milton (1608–1674), whose
appealing Satan is presented as a villain while still managing to challenge many orthodox
Christian  assumptions  through  his  speeches  in  Paradise  Lost  (Rastogi  1987:172).  The
Invocation at the beginning of Iqbāl’s Zabūr-i ʿAjam, published already five years earlier,
in which he asked God to
illuminate my [lifeless] clay
with the light of David’s tune;
khākam bah nūr-i naghmah-yi Dāvūd bar furūz;
(Zabūr-i ʿAjam in Iqbāl [1342sh] 1370sh: 116–77, here 116, line 10)
echoes the invocation of Milton at the beginning of Paradise Lost:
What in me is dark
Illumin [sic], what is low raise and support;
(Milton 2007:12, lines 22–3)
Iqbāl appeared not only drawn to these writers’ critiques because he could utilize them
for his own, but to a large extent also because they put their own Christian spirituality
forward for critical re-examination in the light of the Christian Scriptures.
10 Perhaps Iqbāl’s closest Christian influence, however, was Henri Bergson (1859–1941), the
popular French life-philosopher whose thoughts on space, time, creativity, and freedom
influenced many of Iqbāl’s own.12 While Bergson was born into a Jewish family, he had
himself  developed  a  close  affinity  to  Christian—particularly  Catholic—mysticism,  and
cited it as an important source of his own philosophical ideas:
We may therefore conclude that neither in Greece nor in ancient India was there
complete mysticism … For complete mysticism is that of the great Christian mystics
…  There  is  no  doubt  that  most  of  them  passed  through  states  resembling  the
various  culminating  phases  of  the  mysticism  of  the  ancients.  But  they  merely
passed through them: bracing themselves up for an entirely new effort, they burst a
dam; they were then swept back into a vast current of life; from their increased
vitality there radiated an extraordinary energy, daring, power of conception and
realization. (Bergson 1932:240)13
11 In  Bergson’s  conception,  his  theories  were  best  exemplified in  the  lives  of  Christian
mystics, a reality which evidently provided a challenge for Iqbāl, who worked hard to find
the  spiritual  ideals  he  found  in  these  Western  writings  incarnated  in  the  Muslim
tradition.
12 The  polemic  against  Christianity  developed  by  Iqbāl,  as  Schimmel  points  out,  is
dissatisfying to a reader well-versed in Christian and Islamic history, for, she argues, his
arguments are prophetic and not historical, born of a necessity to pit ideal Islam against
historical Christianity and Islam (Schimmel 1963:382–3). This pairing of the disappointing
historical expressions of Islam and Christianity can be seen clearly developing in the
poetry  of  that  middle  period  of  Iqbāl’s  literary  work  between  1909  and  1926,  a
characteristic few verses in his Zabūr-i ʿAjam describing
Mosque and tavern, temple, church and synagogue—
a hundred deceits on the heart were tried,
and yet the heart was never satisfied.
masjid va maykhānah va dayr va kalīsā va kunisht
ṣad fusūn az bahr-i dil bastand va dil khūshnūd nī.
(Iqbāl [1342sh] 1370sh:149, line 23 [Zabūr-i ʿAjam])
This equivalency of Christian and Muslim religious ethos must also be understood in the
context  of  Iqbāl’s  understanding  of  Christians  as  among  the  “People  of  the  Book,”
between Muslims and whom there are “no social barriers” (Iqbal 1964:190). Herein we
might find one reason for why Iqbāl devoted considerably more thought to Christianity:
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its  commonalities  with  Islam  necessitated  much  greater  effort  to  work  out  more
sophisticated arguments for  legitimizing the superiority of  Islam.  In comparison,  the
religion of the Hindus at Iqbāl’s immediate doorsteps was treated rather disdainfully: in
his writings it appears more as a metaphor itself for sectarianism and division than as a
religion, forming a logical opposition to the social equality in the Abrahamic religions. In
referring to Muslim sectarianism in India, Iqbāl stated that Muslims have “out-Hindued
the Hindu himself” (Iqbal 1964:54), and, in the light of heightened communal tension in
British India of the mid-1920s,14 it is little surprising that in his Urdu poem Nayā Shivālah
Iqbāl blames the “idols” in the temples of the Brahmin (ṣanamkadoṇ ke but) for the hatred
on both sides of the Muslim-Hindu divide in India (Nayā Shivālah in Iqbāl ([1924] 1926:88f).
Even as he devoted time and effort to the critique of Christianity and Christian thought,
Iqbāl  afforded  a  certain  respect  to  the  religious  thought  of  Christianity  in  taking  it
seriously enough to do so, something he does not do with the religion of the Hindus.
 
Social Critique
13 The character of Iqbāl’s mounting criticism of Christianity in the light of the emerging
movement  for  national  independence  from the  early  1920s  onwards,  that  somewhat
overlapped with the eruption of communalist sentiments in India only a little later, fits
into a  larger theological  and social  scheme devised by Iqbāl  in which the tawḥīd,  or
Oneness,  of  God  serves  as  a  starting  point  for  not  only  religious  belief  but  social
organization and scientific inquiry.  However,  his criticism is not necessarily a quirky
scholastic argument about theological subtleties, but embedded in a wider attempt to
position himself towards the “West,” conceptualized as a distinct epistemic community.
As  such,  he  had  to  acknowledge  the  Christian  roots  of  even  the  most  radical  non-
theological cosmologies and anthropologies which are somewhat epitomized by Kant’s
“Copernican turn” (Kant 1788:288). In the light of such new frameworks that are no more
dependent on recourse to a numinous entity in order to sustain worldviews and moral
imperatives, Iqbāl was left with little choice to critically engage with its foundations, as
long as he wanted to sustain his conviction in the absolute inevitability of a religious
grounding of all human pursuit. His resulting argument would then necessarily be based
on not further justifiable beliefs, a fact that prompted the Franciscan priest Augustine
Fernandez in the mid-1950s to critically remark that Iqbāl’s thought as a whole lacks the
rigor of any philosophical enquiry and is based more on arbitrary personal preferences
than  on  a  logically  consistent  framework  (Fernandez  1956).  The  logically  consistent
systemacy that  Fernandez called for  would be even structurally prevented by Iqbāl’s
oftentimes deliberately chosen poetic form of expression, yet it seems wrong to urge this
as a proof for his alleged philosophical insubstantiality. After all, in Friedrich Nietzsche
(1844–1900), he possessed of a role-model who had adopted distinct literary forms for the
expression of his explicitly anti-systematic philosophical ideas (.15 Indeed, Iqbāl did not
only share Nietzsche’s appreciation of emotion-evoking literary forms, but increasingly
also the related suspicion in Christian religious thought.
14 In advancing his criticism of Christianity as a potential foundation of ideas dangerously
close to forsaking the necessity of God as ultima ratio, Iqbāl starts with a rejection of the
Christian concept  of  Trinity  in  contrast  with the  Islamic  conception of  the  Absolute
Oneness (tawḥīd)  of  God.  He did however not remain there,  but tied the two distinct
conceptions  of  the  divine  to  distinct  anthropologies.  For  Iqbāl  namely,  so  at  least
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Schimmel argues, the tawḥīd of God is reflected in the tawḥīd of the human person, so that
no division can be made between body and soul (Schimmel 1963:93). In his poetry from
roughly the decade between 1925 and 1935, Iqbāl sometimes used more typically dualistic
mystical  imagery  directly  before  clarifying  and  contradicting  it.  For  instance,  in  his
Jāvīdnāmah from 1932 he proclaimed:
Man is but sight, what remains is mere skin;
true sight signifies seeing the Beloved.
Dissolve the whole body into sight—
go to gazing, go to gazing, go to gaze!
ādamī dīdāst bāqī-yi pūst ast
dīdan-i ān bāshid kih dīd-i dūst ast
jumlah-yi tan rā dar gudāz-i andar baṣar
dar naẓar-i rū va dar naẓar-i rū va dar naẓar!
(Iqbāl [1342sh] 1370sh:283, lines 15–6 [Jāvīdnāmah])16
Yet immediately following these verses Iqbāl explained that the body, as a contingent in
time and space, is “but a state of the soul” (īn dū yak ḥāl ast az aḥvāl-i jān; Jāvīdnāmah in
Iqbāl [1342sh] 1370sh: 283, line 18). After all, as Iqbāl stated in many ways, religion is an
expression of the whole human person (Iqbal 1930:3). This belief transcends the personal,
however, and describes the cosmos itself, for life, as Iqbāl has put it, “is not a formless
fluid, but an organizing principle of unity” (Iqbal 1930:82). God’s “free creative energy” is
perceived by human beings as space,  time, and matter,  but there is only one reality,
moving forward in a world of infinite possibilities (Iqbal 1930:91). Iqbāl does not present
this  interpretation  as  novel  but  as  deeply  embedded in  Muslim tradition,  and  looks
especially to the Ashʿarite current of the theology of causation (kalām) for examples of
those who eschewed the Aristotelian notion of a fixed universe and attempted to develop
a dynamic theory of creation which Iqbāl  argues is rooted in the Qurʾānic revelation
(Iqbal 1930:97–8).
15 In Iqbāl’s scheme, this radical Oneness is identical with the revelatory understanding of
the prophet. While describing the sometimes divergent experiences of the mystic and the
prophet,  Iqbāl  in  fact  united  the  two  in  arguing  that  a  prophet  is  a  mystic  whose
experience of  the one God “tends to overflow its  boundaries” (Iqbal  1930:174–5)  and
works towards the shaping of communal life as a result. It is the same experience which
Iqbāl expected of a true poet, as Schimmel, herself rather poetically, posits (Schimmel
1963:62). What she does here has, in fact, its roots not in Iqbāl’s writings, but reflects
rather  Johann  Wolfgang  von  Goethe’s  (1749–1832)  much  earlier  conception  of  the
relationship  of  poet  and  prophet.17 Schimmel’s  tacit  and  somewhat  anachronistic
conflation of Iqbāl with Goethe is not entirely without justification, as the former was
emphatically impressed and subsequently influenced by the latter, although Schimmel
brushes aside the fundamental difference in the conclusion drawn by each of the two
authors, a fact, however, that prompted Iqbāl to respond poetically to Goethe with his
Payām-i Mashriq from 1924.18 Other than Goethe namely, who raised the free-thinking poet
above divinely determined prophecy, for Iqbāl the free thought would—by definition—
detach man from God as  substance and ultimate cause of  all  existent;  prophecy and
poetry would thus need to fall necessarily in one.
16 The prophet’s mission, grounded in mystic experience and expressed in poetry, can never
remain individual but must necessarily draw others together in unity. “Nations are born
in the hearts of Poets” (Iqbal 1964:77),  because the poet,  in Iqbāl’s scheme, is not an
individual man but a communicator of the unity of God.
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17 The  natural  outcome  of  Islam’s  commitment  to  ultimate  unity,  then,  for  Iqbāl,  is
egalitarianism and democracy. Iqbāl sees this as expressed in the most basic forms of
Islam, such as in prayer, which he argues is more social in Islam than in other religions, in
which  people’s  inner  selves  are  united  and  eventually  make  themselves  manifest  in
human relations (Iqbal 1930:126–7). He describes the congregational prayer, as well as the
direction of prayer, as an expression of the normatively established “social equality” of
believers within their community, one which he points out makes possible the shared
standing  of  the  “aristocratic  Brahmin  of  South  India”  (Iqbal  1930:128–9)  and  the
untouchable. This sense of shared human unity is, in his view, justified as well by Islamic
political  history and the development of  the Caliphate as  a  unifying principle of  the
Muslim socio-political body. Iqbāl described varied historical expressions of this political
concept but emphasizes that in all cases, the most important aspect of a Muslim political
system is “election,” the equal right of all Muslims to share in determining their political
and social reality (Iqbal 1964:74): “The Muslim Commonwealth,” in short, “is based on the
absolute equality of all Muslims in the eye of the law” (Iqbal 1964:59), the latter being the
divinely decreed sharīʿa.
18 Posed  against  this  idealistic  vision  of  a  radically  egalitarian  Islam  are  the  various
corrupting  influences  it  has  encountered in  its  history,  including but  not  limited  to
Christianity.  Just  as  significant  in  the history of  Muslim thought  to  the influence of
Christianity is the influence of classical thought. Iqbāl, all in all seemingly comfortable
within a mainstream Ashʿarite tradition of kalām (extensively on this notion, see Eichner
[2009:145–69 et passim]), is skeptical of Hellenist and later Christian Scholastic thought
and insists on the divergences between classical philosophy and the revelation of the
Qurʾān. He contrasts what he sees as the anthropocentric focus of Greek philosophy with
the comprehensive vision of the Qurʾān. The philosophers of antiquity denigrated the
importance of the senses, while the Qurʾān views them as gifts of God (Iqbal 1930:4–5).
Consequently, Iqbāl was critical of Islamic peripatetic and Avicennan philosophy,19 which,
along with Aristotelian thought, he associated with outdated interpretations of time and
space. He contrasted Bergson’s views on time and its “creative freedom” with the static
universe of the Christian Scholastics, and concluded that the Qurʾān would beyond doubt
be reconcilable with the former views (Gutas 1988:39–83).20 It is for this reason that Iqbāl
stressed  that  even  if  the  Hellenist  and  Islamic  worlds  share  excellence  in  scientific
inquiry, it must not be concluded that they also share one worldview: Islamic science, he
argued,  developed  precisely  in  opposition  to  Greek  science  and  expresses  a  wholly
different approach (Iqbal 1930:182). Thus, the European heritage of Hellenic and Hellenist
antiquity is presented as inherently opposed to the spirit of freedom embodied in Islam.
19 While Greek thought  is  grossly portrayed as  focusing too particularly on the human
world, Christianity on the whole is depicted as too dismissive of the created world and
permeated with a divisive, world-denying dualism. Iqbāl does not see Christianity as the
source of this dualism, but instead repeatedly refers to it as Manichean or exhibiting
Zoroastrian influence.  In one striking instance,  he draws a historical  thread between
Manicheanism, Christianity and Cartesianism which he sees as explanatory of Western
history’s dualistic tendencies on the whole (Iqbal 1930:145). By describing Christianity as
influenced  by  Zoroastrian  and  Manichean  ideas,  Iqbāl  is  placing  Christianity  in  a
historical tradition of Persian dualism which, he wrote in his doctoral thesis, was unable
to incorporate “the principle of Unity as a philosophical ground of all that exists” (Iqbāl
1908:20) before the advent of Islam. Interestingly, Iqbāl’s discussion of Islam’s opposition
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to Hellenism echoes liberal Christian criticism of the early “Hellenization” of Christianity,
most notably articulated by the protestant theologian and church historian Adolf von
Harnack (1851–1930) (for example, Harnack 1889–91:I/7–9 and 16–21), but Iqbāl chose to
minimize Christianity’s Hellenistic influence by emphasizing its connection to Persian
dualism. As his main support in this argument, he cited Oswald Spengler’s (1880–1936)
then most popular Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West), agreeing with him
that  early  Christianity  can  be  classed  as  a  “Magian”  religion,  but  denying  that  the
Manichean aspects of Islam as practiced are fundamental to its structure (Iqbal 1930:198–
201). In doing so, he was able to depict Islam as a happy medium between an allegedly
anthropocentric Hellenism—something that Iqbāl himself embraced perhaps to a greater
extent than he would readily admit (Iqbal 1930:ch.4)—and world-denying Manicheanism,
united with Christianity.
20 He stated repeatedly that Christianity was originally formed as “a monastic order,” and as
such has manifested its theological tendencies towards the bifurcation of the spiritual
and material, including the political, in many stages of its historical development. He at
times  selectively  cites  historical  facts  to  serve  his  thesis, such  as  in  arguing  that
Christianity’s  monastic  tendency  was  not  countered  until  Constantine  I  “The  Great”
(r. 306–37),  who attempted to  use Christianity  as  a  force of  centralization—a process
which he proves was doomed to failure by noting that a later Byzantine Emperor, Julian II
“The Apostate” (r. 360–3), reverted to what he saw as “paganism.” He does not mention
that  the  Byzantine  Empire  returned  to  Christianity  following  Julian’s  death  (Iqbal
1930:205).  Iqbāl  is  insistent  on  the  relationship  between asceticism and  Christianity,
something which Schimmel connects to a historical understanding of Jesus as a model for
asceticism in Islam (Schimmel 1963:265). This connection with asceticism is the source of
his main criticism of Christianity, as he is typically critical of religion which emphasizes
self‑denial and focus on “another world.” In one of the ghazals in his Urdu anthology
Bang-i Darā from 1924 Iqbāl wrote:
As you have abandoned the mundane world, renounce too the world beyond …
Good if the heart goes guarded by reason,
But let it go by itself, once in a while.
dunyā jo chħoṛ dī he to ʿuqbah bħī chħoṛ de ...
achchħā he dil ke sātħ rahe pāsbān-i ʿaql
lekin kabħī kabħī isse tanhā bħī chħoṛ de.
(Majnūn ne Shahr Chħoṛā to Ṣaḥrā bħī Chħoṛ De in Iqbāl [1924] 1926:112, lines 2f and 9)
It  is  very important  for  him to assert  the essential  goodness  of  the universe and of
humankind  in  Islam  in  order  to  fit  into  his  understanding  of  man’s  free  ethical
development and the Oneness of God as the source of all things (Iqbal 1964:34–5). He
frames Christianity as a foil  to Islam: while Christianity contains a “sharp opposition
between the subject and the object, the mathematical without and the biological within”
(Iqbal 1930:11–2), Islam seeks to transform man’s relationship between the world and the
soul.
21 This otherworldly tendency in Christianity, however, is not just a result of Manichean
influence in Iqbāl’s scheme, but reflective of the division at the core of Christianity’s
theological worldview. Without the absolute monotheism of the Qurʾān which implies a
complete unity of the universe, “Christian Rome did not rise to the full apprehension of
the idea of humanity as a single organism” (Iqbal 1930:195). At this point in time, Islam
had for  Iqbāl  become an expression of  some kind of  “biological  unity”  between the
individual,  the world,  and God, an unparalleled vision of Oneness from which all  the
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ethical  commandments and religious doctrine of  Islam flow naturally  (Iqbal  1930:i),21
whereas in Christianity these glimpses of truth are instead arbitrarily imposed and do not
fit into a comprehensive theological scheme.
22 An example of this difference often used by Iqbāl is the concept of resurrection in Islam
and  Christianity.  For  Christianity,  resurrection  is  predicated  upon  the  historical
resurrection of a single person in the first century CE, but for Islam, resurrection is a
universal  and natural  fact,  not  exclusive to humanity and integral  to the makeup of
creation  (Iqbal  1930:161).  Similarly,  Iqbāl  argues  that  Christianity  can  have  no
fundamental answer to the question of how there is evil in a world created by a good God,
and instead must attribute it to divine mystery.22 For Islam, however, the world is neither
good  nor  evil,  but  is  instead  growing  towards  an  “eventual  victory  over  evil”  by
humankind  (Iqbal  1930:112–3).23 Iqbāl,  in  strategy  remarkably  similar  to  those  of
(colonial) Christian polemicists against Islam, represents Christianity as a happenstance
historical accumulation of ideas and opinions, while interpreting Islam and its historical
and cultural manifestations according to an idealized narrative.
23 In articulating this theological-historical contrast between Islam and Christianity, Iqbāl
achieves two things:  first,  he is  able to resist  and creatively appropriate for his own
scheme  the  externally-imposed  terms  of  discourse  about  the  necessary  separation
between religious and the secular spheres.24 Secondly, he is able to construct a compelling
metanarrative about the superiority of Islam, crafted in the image and likeness of the
opposing  missionary-colonial  metanarrative  of the  superiority  of  Christianity  and
Western thought. Iqbāl’s polemic should be understood in the light of these priorities of
his, particularly as one examines the weaknesses of his argument with respect to whether
or not it is a faithful representation of historical facts, or of historical Christianity and
Islam.
24 As  a  result  of  his  attempts  to  fit  Christianity  into  a  pre-existing  theory  in  which
Christianity serves to illustrate the truth and beauty of Islam by contrast, Iqbāl  often
makes historical  judgments that draw selectively from the full  spectrum of  Christian
belief. He tends to describe Christianity in a monolithic manner, emphasizing the aspects
of Christianity most seemingly at odds with modernity. For instance, Iqbāl refers to the
“Church” doctrine of “depravity” without reference to the intra-Christian differences
over  human  “depravity”  (and  the  nature  of  human  sinfulness)  between  Catholics,
Lutherans,  Reformed Christians,  and  liberal  Protestants  (Iqbal  1964:36).  He  describes
Christianity as a religious system based on “suffering alone,” taking his characterization
of the tradition as world-denying to its inevitable conclusion, without giving attention to
historical  or  contemporary  aspects  of  Christian  faith  expression  that  contradict  this
portrayal (Iqbal 1964:78). In this broad assertion, he is perhaps influenced by the popular
Nietzschean  criticisms  of  Christianity  as  weak  and  an  expression  of  slave  morality
(Rastogi 1987:60–80).25
25 On the whole, Iqbāl does not cite from a variety of Christian sources or historical sources
on Christianity, as he does with Islam, but usually makes his arguments without textual
backing. In his Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, first published
in 1930, Iqbāl’s claims about Christianity derive almost exclusively from one single and
initially rather small book by Friedrich Naumann (1860–1919), Briefe über Religion (Letters
on Religion), first published in 1903, which, despite its huge popularity in late Wilhelmian
Germany—the work saw seven constantly enlarged editions over a period of ten years—
has apparently never been translated into English.26 Iqbāl  cited Naumann in order to
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support his assertion that religious ideas and social praxis are completely separated in
Christianity: “Primitive Christianity attached no value to the preservation of the state,
law,  organization,  production.  It  simply does not reflect  on the conditions of  human
society” (Iqbal 1930:231).27 For Iqbāl, this was proof of the otherworldly orientation of
Christianity as opposed to what he saw as the comprehensive worldview of Islam.
26 Iqbāl’s  view  of  (Protestant)  Christianity  as  one  of  limited  socio‑political  force
corresponded well with the historical realities in post-“Kulturkampf” Germany, at least at
the time of Iqbāl's own sojourn there around 1907: based on a rigid endorsement of the
Lutheran  doctrine  of  the  “Two  Kingdoms,”28 the  “Inner  Mission”  movement  of  the
Protestant Church in the Wilhelmian State epitomized its suspicion in active political
participation,  while  “liberal  Protestantism,”  represented,  among  others,  by  Friedrich
Naumann, withdrew religion, as an ancillary to culture, from the res publica and confined
its  scope  to  the  res  priuata alone,  thus  freeing  politics  from  any  possible  moral
intervention (Fischer 1951:515; Shanahan 1951:270–2; Kaiser 2000).
27 Iqbāl’s use of Naumann’s text compellingly illustrates the division between spiritual and
material/political  reality  Iqbāl  himself  aimed to  overcome.  In  doing so,  however,  he
overstates  the  extent  both  of  Naumann’s  and  (even  more  so)  the  larger  Christian
tradition’s  relationship  to  social  and  political  engagement  in  his  eagerness  to
demonstrate the fundamental irreconcilability of Christianity and Islam on this point.
Naumann, a Protestant minister and, next to sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), one of
the foremost liberal politicians of the late Wilhelmian Empire, was not attempting to
argue  that  Christianity  has  no  ultimate  social  implications  in  its  theology,  but  was
attempting to formulate a Christian response to Marxism based on the importance of the
individual  (Leese  1959:259–60;  Ruddies  2000:324–31;  on  the  Briefe,  see  Shanahan
[1951:286–9]). Naumann’s argument in the 1916 substantially enlarged edition of Briefe
über Religion was that the “Kingdom of God” cannot be found just in churches, but instead
in  the  “free  reign  of  God  in  man  himself”  (Naumann  1916:104).29 Despite  Iqbāl’s
conclusion that Christianity imagines the other world as the only one of real importance,
Naumann was preoccupied with locating the Kingdom of God on earth in interpersonal
relationships: “The kingdom of God is realized neither in the State nor in the Church’, he
wrote in his Geist und Glaube from 1911, “but it is a spiritual movement from man to man”
(Naumann 1911:258). The “Kingdom of God” is never wholly realized, but does not merely
exist in the future:
The Kingdom of God hovers over us all as an eternal hope. Our hands try in vain to
grasp it. It calls to us enticingly, as does the horizon … This, however, is God’s art,
that  He  gives  to  every  place,  every  generation,  every  person  a  proper  horizon
whose outline can be discerned (Naumann [1902] 1904:559, also quoted in English
translation in Leese [1959:269]).
In this notion Naumann appears to have been closer to Kant than one might think: his
Christianity was one of choice, the “Kingdom of God” almost identical with Kant’s “God”
as a regulative idea of pure reason.30 Citizenship, in turn, depended for Naumann on each
individual’s moral actions within the “community,” to be considered distinct from the
“state” as an entity that, in its pure condition, is exclusively utilitarian and, therefore,
indifferent towards any kind of morals (Shanahan 1951:298–9).
28 Iqbāl obscures the nuances of Naumann’s arguments in his concern with using him to
present a simple dichotomy between Christianity as world-denying and Islam as world-
engaging. His use of Naumann is further complicated by the fact that Naumann was
writing not as a historian of religious history but, like Iqbāl, was attempting to construct
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a social ideal based on a theologically grounded worldview. Iqbāl reworked aspects of this
Idealist construction in order to make a historical argument against Christianity.
29 Iqbāl’s theological and socio-political critique of Christianity provides an explanation for
“unworldly” tendencies within Muslim history as well. Apart from his negative appraisal
of  (Protestant)  Christianity’s  socio-political  potential,  within  a  universal  “salvation
history” (on the concept, see Calder [2000:73–4]), of which Islam would only be the final
chapter, Christianity—here perhaps more its various monastic varieties—also served in
Iqbāl’s worldview as for the source of what he deemed widespread excessive beliefs and
practices in Sufi  mysticism. In a letter to Sayyid Sulaymān Nadvī  (d. 1373/1953) from
1917,  he  interprets  the  traditional  Muslim saying  about  the  downfall  of  the  Islamic
civilization in three centuries as referring to Sufism coming into being as a result of
“Christian monkery” (Schimmel 1963:364). “It was, however,” wrote Iqbāl already in his
doctoral thesis from 1908,
principally the actual life of the Christian hermit rather than his religious ideas,
that exercised the greatest fascination over the minds of the early Islamic Saints
whose complete unworldliness, though extremely charming in itself, is, I believe,
quite contrary to the spirit of Islam. (Iqbal 1908:101)
Christianity,  like  Greek philosophy,  serves  as  an explanation for  apparent  deviations
throughout  Muslim  history  from  the  socio-religious  vision  Iqbāl  sees  for  Islam.  In
distinguishing Christian ideas from the “unworldliness” of Christian praxis, furthermore,
Iqbāl makes it possible to imply the theological purity of Islam while recognizing that it
has  not  always  lived  up  to  the  lofty  ideals  he  sees  present  in  it.  Iqbāl  consistently
interprets historical facts so that positive outcomes are always attributable to Islamic
ideas, particularly the core-dogma of the “Oneness” of God, and negative outcomes to
non-Islamic  ones,  particularly  dualistic  beliefs.  Here,  one  could  easily  infer  that
Christianity did not only serve as a demarcation line from the colonial power holders, but
also very much as a projection screen for the non-Muslim majority in India: after all, it
was them with whom the Muslim elites in the subcontinent engaged in an increasingly
fierce competition over the socio-political vision of an eventually independent India. This
transferal of the “Other” from Christian to Hindu would become increasingly clear as his
support for a separate Muslim state became more stringent, as will be discussed below.
30 For Iqbāl, the otherworldly orientation of Christianity (even as present in non-Christian
traditions,  including  Islam)  led  inevitably  to  political  and  social  inequality,  whereas
Islam’s belief in absolute unity working through human history led to political and social
equality. This movement can be seen clearly in his discussion of “original sin” and the
different Islamic and Christian normative depictions of creation in The Reconstruction of
Religious Thought in Islam. He describes the biblical narrative as based in historical terms,
an  attempted  origin  myth  couched  in  sexual  language  and  imagery.  Man’s  inferior
position to God gives rise to a general sense of inequality, eventually expressed also in
socially  connoted  stratification  in  estates.  The  Qurʾān,  on  the  other  hand,  is  less
historically grounded, more generalized. While up to this point Iqbāl’s argument seems
historically self-evident—given that the biblical narrative was established in the context
of  the  Near  Eastern  mythological  world,  and  the  Qurʾān’s narrative  was  a  later,
generalizing reinterpretation of that myth—he drew larger theological conclusions from
many of the differences between the two texts, the divine origin of which Iqbāl never put
in  question.  He  saw  the  a-historical  setting  of  the  Qurʾānic  creation  narrative  as
indicative of  its  relevance for  all  human beings,  and the garden as  a  clear  symbolic
presentation of a “primitive state” of man before cultural development, as opposed to a
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historical setting. He sees a pessimism in the text of Genesis not reflected in the Qurʾān—
the God of Genesis “curses the ground” as a response to Adam’s transgression, whereas in
the Qurʾān the earth remains essentially good (Iqbal 1930:114–7). Iqbāl acknowledged the
traditional Christian reading of the book of Genesis, which depicts the passage as the
cosmic advent of original sin, and in contrast cited the Qurʾānic verse 7 (al-Aʿrāf): 10:
“And  surely  We  have  established  you  on  earth  and  given  you  therein  the  ways  of
livelihood.  Little  are you grateful.”31 Iqbāl  accepted the orthodox Christian dogma of
original sin at face value, polemically depicting it in its severest possible form, in which—
in contrast to Islam—the world is “a torture-hall where an elementally wicked humanity
is imprisoned for an original act of sin” (Iqbal 1930:117).
31 These assertions,  for Iqbāl,  were of  extreme importance in articulating the historical
differences  between  Christian  and  Islamic  polities.  In  Christianity,  the  separation
between Church and State is possible precisely because of this otherworldliness which
Iqbāl labors to reproduce in Christian history:
If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then
what has happened to Christianity in Europe is  perfectly natural.  The universal
ethics of Jesus is displaced by national systems of ethics and polity. (Iqbal 1964:163)
This has also allowed for religious fanaticism to develop in Christian countries in a way
Iqbāl  believes  would be impossible  or  inconceivable  within a  normatively  envisioned
Islamic society.  Arguing against Nehrū  about the danger of “Inquisition” in a society
based on religious beliefs—a clear indication that his work was indeed less abstract and
deeply embedded in the very concrete realities of contemporary British India—, Iqbāl
asserted that “there is a tremendous difference between the inner structure of Islam and
Catholicism” (Iqbal 1964:262–3). Much of this difference has to do with the complexity
and bureaucratic nature of the Christian Church, which is unthinkable in a Muslim state
wherein the conceptual premises are simple and conducive to social order. Iqbāl places
fault in Christian history on the excesses of the Church, such as in describing the Saint
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in sixteenth century France as an act of assassination on the
part of  the Pope of  Rome,  as opposed to a crackdown on Protestant leadership by a
Catholic  monarch,  King Charles  IX (r. 1560–74),  acting somewhat  independently  from
Church authority (Iqbal 1908:60). Acknowledging religious fanaticism as a product of a
state as opposed to an otherworldly oriented church would both undermine his thesis
and, more importantly, his argument that a separate Islamic society in India (and, as it
would become, Pakistan) would not be vulnerable to the same kinds of fanaticism and
violence, a view that the later realities in Pakistan would profoundly belie.
32 In imagining what such an Islamic society would look like, Iqbāl’s thought reveals some
unresolved tensions. On the one hand, the ideal Islamic society is a perfect expression of
the openness and egalitarianism contained in the dynamism and infinite possibilities of
the tawḥīd of  God.  In this  vein,  Iqbāl  imagines  Islam as  uniquely able  to  accept  and
acknowledge other’s  differences:  “All  men and not  Muslims alone are meant  for  the
Kingdom  of  God  on  earth,  provided  they  say  good-bye  to  their  idols  of  race  and
nationality, and treat one another as personalities” (Iqbal 1964:99). Some of Iqbāl’s poems
long for this same discarding of religious difference in favor of a more fundamental unity:
Sickened, I finally renounce both, temple and shrine …
Let’s lift the curtain of estrangement, once again,
Let’s unite once more the sundered, wipe clean division’s stain.
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tang ā ke meṇ ne ākhir dayr va ḥaram ko chħoṛā ...
ā, ghayriyyat ke parde ek bār pħir uṫħā deṇ
bichħṛoṇ ko pħir milā deṇ naqsh-i dūʾī miṫā deṇ.
(Iqbāl [1924] 1926:88, lines 6 and 9 [Nayā Shivālah])
The  heart  of  Iqbāl’s  philosophy  is  a  movement  towards  ultimate  unity,  which  is
necessarily hostile to unnecessary divisions.
33 On the other hand, however, in many of Iqbāl’s writings, this commitment to tawḥīd—
divine and social—is presented as paradoxically predicated upon distinction. The purity
of the Muslim idea cannot be corrupted by outside influences, as it was—as argued above
—by Christian influence, which caused earlier failures in Islamic political organization.
From as early as the 1910s, Iqbāl conceived Muslims as forming a separate “nation” (millat
)  which keeps them distinctly apart from their religious opponents.32 This “Nation of
Muslims,” however, is specifically transnational:
In the heart of a nation that once shattered the world
I have seen a conflict between religion and fatherland.
The spirit is dead in the body through weakness of faith,
despairs of the strength of the manifest religion;
Turk, Persian, Arab intoxicated with Europe
and in the throat of each the fish-hook of Europe.
dar z ̤amīr-i millat-i gītī-shikan
dīdah’am āvīzash-i dīn va vaṭan
rūḥ dar tan-i mardah az z ̤aʿf-i yaqīn
nā umīd az qūt-i dīn-i mubīn
turk va īrān va ʿarab mast-i farang
har kasī rā dar gulū shast-i farang.
(Iqbāl [1342sh] 1370sh:304, lines 5–7 [Jāvīdnamāh])
The bonds between Muslims worldwide are such that Iqbāl can remark that “although the
song is one of Hind, the melody is of Hijazi cast” (naghmah-i hindī he to kyā / lay to ḥijāzī he
merī!) (Iqbāl [1924] 1926:187, line 15 [Shikvah]). It is this triumphant imagined society of
Muslims—not any particular society, but drawn from the entire Muslim world struggling
under the weight of colonialism—to which “this world belongs” (jahān terā he yā merā?)
(Iqbāl 1935:3, line 2).
34 The tension between the meaning of what Iqbāl views as the Islamic message and the
distinctness of Muslims as a social unit pervades his writings, but becomes less clear as
the political situation begins to shape the language of Iqbāl’s rhetoric. “Let nationalism be
on your lips, but fix your gaze always on your own community” (Iqbal 1945:69–73, here 73
[Speech on the Resolution Regarding Filling of Posts by Open Competitive Examination, delivered
on the 19th July, 1927]), Iqbāl proclaimed in seeming contradiction to the “pin[ing] for true
proximity” of his poetry (laẕẕat-i qurb-i ḥaqīqī) (Iqbāl [1924] 1926:29, line 10 [Ṣadā-yi Dard]).
Iqbāl’s anti-Christian rhetoric serves as a means of imagining exactly what an Islamic
community is not: not separatist, not dogmatic, and not prejudicial. The shift of his own
support to a separatist Muslim community, however, renders unstable his philosophy, so
that  his  critique of  Christian society  becomes more and more applicable  to  his  own
religious-political beliefs.
 
Conclusion
35 Iqbāl’s reassertion of the unity and relevance of Islamic thought, in response to colonial
and  missionary  critics  who  portrayed  Islam  in  India  as  stagnant  and  inherently
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detrimental to national progress and polity,33 was an ideological element necessary for
decolonization and the construction of a decolonized “voice.” In this, Iqbāl joined hands
with all those who strove for independence from any kind of foreign hegemony in the
subcontinent and beyond. For him personally, as a Western-educated colonial subject,
this project served to free him to draw at will from his Christian or Christian-influenced
sources  without  capitulating  to  the  demand of  the  colonizers  for  the  recognition of
Christian supremacy.  At  the  same time,  he  could  use the  manifold  Christian-Muslim
relations as a projection screen for the much more pertinent question regarding the
positioning towards the Hindu majority in India. In most instances, Iqbāl’s references to
Hindus remained within the confines of his more political  ideas about nationhood in
India; a however superficial theological and philosophical examination of Hindu religious
thought, perhaps reciprocating Gāṅdħī’s engagement with Islam,34 is by and large absent.
This very fact remains certainly in need of a somewhat sustained explanation by future
research.
36 One may assume that a major reason for this is to be found in the complex communal
relations in late colonial India which suggested that a simple answer to the communal
question in the discussions over India’s political future could not really be given. If that
was indeed the case, then Iqbāl’s focus on Christianity, against which he developed his
own interpretation of Islam, allowed him to avoid the contagious engagement with the
religion of the Hindus. In addition, however, one may assume that Islam’s proximity to
Christianity demanded that the latter is paid more attention in order to delineate Islam as
the highest manifestation of the Abrahamic faiths.  Gāṅdħī‘s own deliberations,  which
lump Christianity and Islam together and put them in contrast to the religion of the
Hindus,35 seem to indicate why Iqbāl devoted so much effort to a critical engagement with
Christianity: after all, the demarcation lines between Abrahamic religions and that of the
Hindus were much more obvious and required thus less argumentation.
37 All in all, however, Iqbāl’s portrayal of Christianity remained instrumental for his project
of rehabilitating Islam as a source for his own thought—and Christianity thus became as
dismissible  as  any other  religion that  was  not  Islam.  Iqbāl’s  use  of  Christianity  as  a
polemic  antagonist  in  order  to  assert  the  dignity  of  Islam against  colonial  critiques
limited his frameworks of interpretation of peoples not “of the Book,” such as Hindus, but
also  of  his  own  religion.  In  simplifying  and  overemphasizing  the  contrast  between
Christian and Islamic theology and social vision, Iqbāl  produces an inherently limited
portrayal of Muslim culture and thought as well, greatly underestimating the potential of
Muslim societies to reproduce the same inequities and dogmatism as European Christian
nations. The ways in which he ultimately reproduces the exclusionary logics he learned
from the “West” gives credence to Said’s assertion that we should be as attentive to the
ways in which imperialism has fundamentally “altered” how we view and understand the
world  as  we  are  of  the  Holocaust’s  “epistemological  mutation.”  Each  reaction  to
colonization (and each reaction to a reaction) creates in turn “distorted knowledge of the
other,  each  its  own  reductive  images,  its  own  disputatious  polemics”  (Said  [1978]
2003:xxii [Preface to the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Edition]). Iqbāl’s framing of Christianity
thus serves as an example both of the power of anti‑colonial narrative and its limits in
imagining a decolonized future.
TWA Papers = Thomas Walker Arnold Papers, SOAS, University of London, Special Collection, PP.MS
32, II/5.
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NOTES
1. Romanization of the various relevant languages in non-Latin scripts follows largely the ALA-LC
conventions  for  each  respective  language;  an  “h”  struck  out  (ħ)  indicates  aspiration  of  the
preceding consonant in Indian languages.
We wish to thank the anonymous referees for their constructive feedback, as well as the editorial
team of SAMAJ for their immense help to navigate a perhaps unwieldy piece towards its final
publication.
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2. Despite of at least two more recent monographs on Iqbāl by Mir (2006) and Majeed (2009), as
well as various problems in how Iqbāl’s life and thought is presented, Schimmel’s work has still
to be regarded the most comprehensive one to date.
3. See, for example some of Gāndħi’s writings: What is Hinduism? (April 1924) and Why I am a Hindu
(October 1927) (Gandhi [1958] 1969: XXIII/484–6 and XXXV/ 166–7 ).
4. The translation of “dār” as “cross” is of course already limiting the wider meaning of the term,
which  includes  also  “gibbet,”  “gallows,”  “beam”  and  “[hanging]  tree.”  However,  since  this
passage is included in a dialogue between Zindah’rūd, the protagonist of the poem, and Manṣūr
al-Ḥallāj, the early Sufi ecstatic who, according to widespread belief, was crucified in Dhī’l-qā‘da
309/March 922 for alleged blasphemy, the translation as “cross” appears perfectly justified.
5. Compare Acts 17:28 (NKJV): “For in Him we live and move and have our being, as also some of
your own poets have said, “For we are also His offspring.’”
6. Compare Matthew 5:48 (KJV): “Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven
is perfect.”
7. The notion of the “Perfect Man” (insān kāmil), which was central in the thought of al-Jīlī, was
also to play a crucial role in Iqbāl’s own reflections. See, for example, Zwanzig (2008:75–96).
8. See the “Certificate of Agreement between the Secretary of State for India and Dr. Thomas
Walker Arnold Esq.” over the professorship in Philosophy at the Government College Lahore for
the duration of five years from 31 December 1897, in TWA Papers (II/5).
9. See the farewell addresses of his students from the Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, where
Arnold taught for a decade from 1888, as well as of the Anjumān-i Islāmiyyah of the Punjab in 1904,
in ibid. (I/1:nos. 7 and 119).
10. Compare TWA Papers (IV/4:nos. 15–16).
11. On the problematic notion of “civility,” from which “civilization” is derived, in nineteenth
and  early  twentieth  century  Europe  and  Asia,  see  the  various  contributions  in  Pernau  and
Jordheim (2015).
12. On the impact of Bergson on Iqbāl see, for example, Rastogi (1987:81–95); Bausani (1954:182–
3). Also, see the explicit appraisal of Bergson by Iqbāl ([1342sh] 1370sh: 266 [Payghām-i Bargsun]
and 268 [Bargsun]; Iqbal (1930:3, 49–50, 53, 62–4, 70–3, 87 and 197).
13. Translation follows Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton, 1935.
14. In fact, the disintegration of the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movements in the early 1920s,
and the subsequent mutual recrimination of their Muslim and Hindu leaders, drastically fuelled
communalist sentiments that increasingly manifested themselves in the firm conviction that a
Hindu-Muslim commonwealth was absolutely impossible. See, for example, Hasan (1979).
15. In particular, see Die fröhliche Wissenschaft in Nietzsche 1967–77:III/147–51 [§§110–2], 192 [§
246], 275–7 [§355] and 307–8 [§§372f]).
16. This is a combined quote of two separate passages from Rūmī’s famous Mas ̱navī.  Compare
Rūmī ([1375sh] 1376sh:I/66, line 17, II/968, line 14).
17. Compare Mahomet, in Goethe (1985–98:I-1/516–9); West-Östlicher Diwan in ibid. (XI-1.2/19, 23
and 117–24); Besserem Verständniss [sic] in ibid. (XI-1.2/147–51).
18. This is made explicit in the subtitle of this four-partite poetical anthology, “In Response to
the [West‑Eastern] Divan of the German Poet Goethe” (dar javāb dīvān-i shāʾir-i ālmān Guʾitah), in
which Goethe, inspired by the example of Ḥāfiẓ of Shiraz (d. 792/1390), advocated a henoteistic
worldview as elaborated by Baruch de Spinoza (d. 1677); see Etiches: De Deo in Spinoza (1925:II/45–
83), in which all the diverse manifestations of religion is only a culturally distinct expression of
the universal “one and all” (Gr.: hen kaì pân). Compare Goethe, “Parabase,” in Werke, vol. 13/1,
150, lines 5f: “… das ewig Eine, das sich vielfach offenbart [the One Eternal / Multiply self‑manifest].”
19. See  Gutas  (1988:359–86),  who  argues  for  a  clear  distinction  between  the  philosophical
traditions before Avicenna and those threats that developed from him.
20. Compare Bergson (1889:107–68); Bergson ([1907] 1908:1–8, 95–105, and 269–94).
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21. In a later passage in this work, Iqbāl quoted a passage from Rūmī ([1375sh] 1376sh:III/179 line
26, and III/180 lines 1–5 and 11–3), in the rather generous translation of Nanikrām Vasanmal
Thādānī (d. 1956) in idem (1932), declaring that “the formulation of the theory of evolution in the
world of Islam brought into being Rumi’s tremendous enthusiasm for the biological future of
man.” Iqbal (1934:176–7).
22. Interestingly,  Iqbāl  appears to have been fully,  and perhaps deliberately,  ignorant of  the
long-standing discussions of the Theodicy problem in Christian philosophical circles all the way
into the Enlightenment period, culminating perhaps in the deliberations of Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz (d. 1716). This is even more surprising as one of Iqbāl’s chief epigones, Miyāṇ Muḥammad
Sharīf  (d. 1965),  used  Leibniz  explicitly  and  in  abundance  for  his  advancement  of  Iqbāl’s
philosophy as “Dialectical Monadism.” See Sharif (1952);  compare Leibniz (1996:II/343–88 and
592–621).
23. Parallels  to  core  ideas  in  the  philosophy  of  Nietzsche  are  hard  to  miss,  despite  serious
reservations against the philosophical consequences of such a radical moral nihilism. See, for
example, Payām-i Mashriq in Iqbāl ([1342sh] 1370sh:260–3, esp. 263, line 15), where, in his second
aphorism on Nietzsche, Iqbāl wrote: “His heart is a true believer, but his brain an infidel” (qalb-i ū
muʾmin dimāghash kāfir ast).
24. According  to  Chakrabarty  (2000:86–96),  the  colonial  imposition  of  “secular”  logic  and
“secular time” involved and continues to involve a violent expulsion of divine or superhuman
presences  from the reality  and history  of  the  colonized (or  formerly  colonized).  Taking this
critique into account, Iqbāl’s historical polemic about the sources of Christianity’s world-denial
can  be  understood  as  resistance  to  the  discourse  of  modernity  imposed  through  colonial
relationships.
25. Compare Nietzsche (1967–77: V/65–83 [Jenseits von Gut und Böse] and 339–412 [Zur Genealogie
der Moral]).
26. There exists however a French translation by Roger Bornand, published in Lausanne with
Georges Bridel & Cie, from as early as 1905. See also Ruddies (2000:317 n.1).
27. This quote does hardly correspond to the German original. While the general tenor might be
correctly reflected in a fair number of Naumann’s published letters, the second sentence appears
too harsh a judgement and too detached from the overall theological argument to have indeed
originated in the Christian theologian Naumann. Compare Naumann ([1903] 1906:74–9).
28. This doctrine, although neither Luther nor his main compatriot Philipp Melanchton (d. 1560)
have ever  used  the  phrase  “two  kingdoms”  themselves,  was  mainly  based  on  Luther’s
elaborations on the relationship of church and state, or Gospel and positive (state) law, in his
1523 treatise Von weltlicher Obrigkeit, wie weit man ihr Gehorsam schuldig sei, as well as on various
other situation-related statements. See Luther (1982: IV/36–84, esp. 51). In his letters, Naumann
emphatically endorsed this view when he wrote that “We return to the old great Doctor of the
German faith [i.e. Luther] and regard the political affairs as being outside the sphere of influence
of the promise of salvation [Heilsverkündung].” Naumann ([1903] 1906:78) (trans. JPH).
29. Unless stated differently, all translations from Naumann’s works are by Anne Liard Jennings.
Also quoted in Leese (1959:265).
30. Compare Kant (1787:670–97 and 832–47).
31. Qurʾān 7:10: wa-laqad makkannākum fi’l-arḍi wa-jaʿalā lakum fīhā maʿāyisha qalīman mā tashqurūn.
See quote in Iqbal (1930:116).
32. See two of Iqbāl’s works: Rumūz Bī-Khūdī (1918) and Mas ̱navī-yi Musāfir (1934) (Iqbāl [1342sh]
1370sh:55–104; Iqbāl [1342sh] 1370sh:417–31, esp. 418, 421, 427 and 431).
33. See, for example, the comment of the Christian convert Rev. ʿImād al-Dīn Lāhiz (d. 1900),
reflecting the standard European missionary discourse, that Islam was capable only of producing
“decay upon decay”: [Lāhiz] (1910:10).
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34. For an index of Gāṅdħī’s writings on Islam and Islam-related matters from as early as March
1905, see Gandhi ([1958] 1969:XCVIII/174–5).
35. In Gāṅdħī’s Collected Works ([1958] 1969), see, for example, pages 246-8 in volume XXXVIII, as
well  as  The  Eternal  Duel (1928)  (Gandhi  [1958]  1969:LXIV/420–4)  and  Discussion  with  a  Roman
Catholic Priest (1937).
ABSTRACTS
In this article we examine the development of Muḥammad Iqbāl’s engagement with Christian
thought and theology over the course of his lifetime in the context of his position as a colonial
subject and of the rise of communalism and Muslim separatism in India. The early philosophical,
spiritual, and poetic influence of European Christian authors on the young Iqbāl inspired him to
develop  a  critique  of  Christian  thought  and  history  that  fundamentally  differentiated
Christianity from Islam and positioned Islamic revelation as the truest origin of many of the
ideals  to  which  he  was  drawn  in  the  works  of  Christian  thinkers.  Iqbāl  mobilized  his
interpretation of the history of Islam (in which devotion to the tawḥīd or Oneness of God led to
egalitarianism, justice, and unity) against that of the history of Christianity (in which a stark
division between heaven and earth resulted in inequality, violence, and sectarianism) to explain
the failures of Christian nations and to develop a basis for his contrasting ideal of a Muslim state.
In this article we demonstrate both the power of this historical-theological polemic in its role as
anti-colonial narrative as well as the ways in which it limited Iqbāl’s recognition of the potential
of  Muslim  societies  to  foster  similar  violence  and  religiously-based  discrimination  to  that
perpetrated by Christian nations.
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